R ev is ed Pr oo f Int J Philos Relig DOI 10.1007/s11153-014-9501-2 ARTICLE How not to render an explanatory version of the evidential argument from evil immune to skeptical theism Daniel Howard-Snyder Received: 30 October 2014 / Accepted: 12 December 2014 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014 Abstract Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether1 explanatory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better2 than William Rowe's famous versions of the evidential argument, for example. Some of3 these students claim that the former are better than the latter in no small part because4 the former, unlike the latter, avoid the sorts of worries raised by so-called "skepti-5 cal theists". Indeed, Trent Dougherty claims to have constructed an explanatory ver-6 sion that is "fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism".7 I argue that he has done no such thing.8 Keywords Problem of evil * Theism * Atheism * God * Skeptical theism *9 Trent Dougherty10 Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether explana-11 tory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better than12 William Rowe's famous versions of the evidential argument, for example.1 Some of13 these students claim that the former are better than the latter in no small part because14 the former, unlike the latter, avoid the sorts of worries raised by so-called "skeptical15 theists".2 We might try to assess this claim in its full generality, but it will prove16 more fruitful, in my opinion, to assess each explanatory version to see whether it is17 better on this score. Elsewhere, I argue that Paul Draper's explanatory version is not18 better.3 Here I argue for the same conclusion for another version, specifically Trent19 Dougherty's, which lacks any premise according to which suffering is more likely or20 1 See Rowe (1979, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1996, 2003). 2 For example, Draper (1992), Draper and Dougherty (2013), and Dougherty (2014). 3 Howard-Snyder, unpublished. D. Howard-Snyder (B) Department of Philosophy, Western Washington University, Bellingham, WA 98225, USA e-mail: Daniel.Howard-Snyder@wwu.edu 123 Journal: 11153-RELI Article No.: 9501 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2014/12/17 Pages: 8 Layout: Small-X R ev is ed Pr oo f Int J Philos Relig predictable on naturalism than theism, a fact about other explanatory versions that21 skeptical theists and their ilk have exploited.4 Indeed, not only does Dougherty's ver-22 sion have no such premise, it is "fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining23 to skeptical theism"-or so he says. Is he right?24 Here's the relevant passage:25 Given: The universe seems indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings.26 1. It is known that the hypothesis of indifference predicts the data of an appar-27 ently indifferent universe.28 2. It is unknown whether the hypothesis of theism predicts the data.29 3. The hypotheses have approximately equal prior probabilities [that is, equal30 chance of being true before considering observational evidence].31 4. Therefore, the data confirm the hypothesis of indifference and not the hypoth-32 esis of theism.33 Here is how the argument works. Imagine a pair of scales in which we are34 weighing evidence concerning theism and atheism. One side of the scales is35 labeled "Theism" and the other side is labeled "Hypothesis of Indifference."36 Premise 3 says the scales are at first even. Premise 2 says that there is nothing37 to put on the scale marked "Theism." Premise 1 says that there is something38 to put on the scale marked "Hypothesis of Indifference." The conclusion says39 that after we have weighed the evidence, the scales tip to the side labeled40 "Hypothesis of Indifference."41 Not only does this argument not make a noseeum inference, it doesn't42 assign any probability at all to observed evils given theism. So this version43 seems to be fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical44 theism, except insofar as they can be brought to bear on premise 3.545 What should we make of this argument and its informal commentary? I'll categorize46 my answer to this question under two headings: the data and the argument.47 But first a remark about "the Hypothesis of Indifference" (HI). Dougherty never tells48 us what it is. Many of us, however, will recognize it from Draper's work, where it is used49 to refer to the hypothesis that "neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings50 on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by nonhuman51 persons".6 Presumably Dougherty has the same thing in mind.52 The data53 We are told that it is "given" that "The universe seems indifferent to the suffering of54 sentient beings." What does that mean? We can give this sentence a de re reading55 and a de dicto reading. On the de re reading, there is an x such that x is numerically56 identical with the universe and x has the property of seeming indifferent to the suffer-57 ing of sentient beings. On the de dicto reading, there is a proposition, the proposition58 4 See, e.g., Bergmann (2009) and Howard-Snyder, unpublished. 5 Dougherty (2014, Sect. 6.3). 6 Draper (1989, p. 13). 123 Journal: 11153-RELI Article No.: 9501 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2014/12/17 Pages: 8 Layout: Small-X R ev is ed Pr oo f Int J Philos Relig that the universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings, and that proposition59 has the property of seeming to be true. My purposes will be served on either reading60 since what I have to say can be said about both, mutatis mutandis. I choose the de61 dicto reading. Notice that, on the de dicto reading, we are told that what's "given"62 as our "data" is that (i) there is a certain proposition-the proposition that the uni-63 verse is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings-and (ii) that proposition has64 the property of seeming to be true. Call this conjunction the data proposition and65 call the proposition brought to our attention in the first conjunct the core proposi-66 tion.67 Now focus on the core proposition, the proposition that the universe is indifferent68 to the suffering of sentient beings. Notice two things about it. First, it presupposes that69 there is something that answers to "the universe" and, second, it attributes a mental70 state to it, the state of indifference. Some of us, impressed by the unsettled state of71 theorizing about the metaphysics of parts and wholes, might well wonder whether72 there is anything that answers to "the universe". But even those of us who have no73 such qualms will insist that it is unwise to ascribe a mental state to the universe. After74 all, the universe is an inanimate object and, as a matter of necessity, inanimate objects75 lack mental states. Taken strictly and literally, it's going to be a hard sell that the core76 proposition has the property of seeming to be true.77 Diagnosis Dougherty is speaking metaphorically. He doesn't really mean to draw78 our attention to the proposition that there is a universe that has a certain mental state,79 the state of indifference. What he means to draw our attention to is a proposition80 that is much less contentious, e.g., that sentient beings on earth suffer in a variety of81 ways without need or benefit, or something like that. Although this is a significant82 improvement, in what follows I will use the proffered metaphorical expression of the83 core proposition.84 So we have the core proposition and a claim about it: that it seems to be true, that it85 has the property of seeming to be true. Here we need to slow down. Do we really want86 to say that the core proposition has the property of seeming to be true? How could87 we tell such a thing? More importantly, what is that property, the property of seeming88 to be true, which the proponent of the argument-call her Athea-says that the core89 proposition has?90 Here we would do well to remember that there's a world of difference between91 saying something of the form "p seems to me to be true" or "it seems to me that p" and92 saying something of the form "p seems to be true" or "it seems that p". Whether any93 particular utterance by me of the former pair is true is a matter of how things stand94 with respect to me, e.g., whether I am in a seeming state toward p when I consider95 it. Whether any particular utterance of the latter pair is true, however, is not a matter96 of how things stand with respect to me (or you, for that matter). Rather, it is more97 a matter of how things stand with respect to p itself. We meet a peculiar resident at98 the local psychiatric ward who claims to be Cleopatra. No doubt it seems to her that99 she is Cleopatra, no doubt that proposition seems to be true to her. But should we100 infer that the proposition that she is Cleopatra, the proposition itself, thereby has the101 property of seeming to be true? Surely not. The same goes for Athea. The proposition102 that the universe is indifferent seems to her to be true. But it hardly follows that that103 proposition has the property of seeming to be true. If ever there was a fallacy, the104 123 Journal: 11153-RELI Article No.: 9501 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2014/12/17 Pages: 8 Layout: Small-X R ev is ed Pr oo f Int J Philos Relig overreaching seemer's fallacy is one: "p seems to me to be true, so p seems to be true"105 or "it seems to me that p, so it seems that p". So what is this property of p, the property106 of its seeming that p, if it isn't the property of its seeming to me that p?107 Although simpliciter seemingness isn't the same property as to-me-seemingness, as108 we might call them, presumably the former is not completely unrelated to the seeming109 states of such persons as there may be. Suppose there were no persons, and so there110 was no one with respect to which any proposition seemed any way. In that case, would111 some proposition still seem to be true, would some proposition have the property of112 simpliciter seemingness? I suspect not. If that's right, then whether or not a proposition113 p has that property is not completely a matter of how things stand with respect to p114 itself, without reference to the seeming states of anyone.115 Are there any propositions that paradigmatically count as having the property of116 simpliciter seemingness? Consider the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4, or the proposition117 that everything red is colored, or the conditional corresponding to modus tollens. If118 any proposition has the property of simpliciter seemingness, the property of seeming119 to be true, these do. So then, suppose they do, and suppose their having simpliciter120 seemingness is a matter of their seeming true to some people or other.121 But which people? That's a surprisingly difficult question to answer. In virtue of122 which people, and what proportion of them, is any particular proposition such that123 it-the proposition itself-has the property of seeming to be true, the property of124 simpliciter seemingness? Call this the "reference class problem".125 Let's think very briefly about some solutions. They fall into two mutually exclu-126 sive and jointly exhaustive classes: (i) the property a proposition has when it seems127 simpliciter to be true is identical with or otherwise closely related to the property of128 its seeming to be true to everyone who considers it, and (ii) the property a proposition129 has when it seems simpliciter to be true is identical with or otherwise closely related130 to the property of its seeming to be true to some but not all people who consider it.131 The problem with the everyone solution, as we might call it, is that it's false. Some132 people who consider at least some of our paradigms are just, well, screwed up. There's133 no nice way to put it. Either they don't understand them when they consider them or they134 understand them but they "just don't get it," as they say. More importantly for present135 purposes, even if our paradigms were such that they seemed to be true to everyone136 who considered them, that wouldn't help Athea. That's because it is false that the core137 proposition-the proposition that the universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient138 beings-seems to be true to everyone who considers it. For example, it doesn't seem139 to be true to me when I consider it. And I'm not alone. It doesn't seem to be true to140 many people when they consider it, especially many students of the problem of evil.141 So on the everyone solution to the reference class problem, the data proposition is142 false.143 What about the alternative, the some-but-not-all-people solution? The problem with144 it is that it is enormously difficult to say which people, and what proportion of them,145 count, and to say so in a way that does not smack of arbitrariness. We can see this146 especially in the case we are concerned with. Athea must specify just which people147 count, and which don't, and explain why her specification is correct. Of course, it148 would be arbitrary in the extreme for her to answer that the only people who count are149 those to whom the core proposition in fact seems to be true. So there must be some150 123 Journal: 11153-RELI Article No.: 9501 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2014/12/17 Pages: 8 Layout: Small-X R ev is ed Pr oo f Int J Philos Relig other way, some non-arbitrary way to identify a population whose seeming states are151 the relevant ones, relevant to the question of how we are to understand what, exactly,152 this property of simpliciter seemingness is supposed to be. Has anyone discovered153 such a way? Of course not. Any such population is a pipedream. But just to pursue154 the matter a little further, suppose we do find some non-arbitrary way to identify our155 pipedream population, and suppose we poll them for the seemers and the no-seemers.156 (Note well: the no-seemers need not be those to whom the core proposition seems157 false. I would think that, typically, the no-seemers will be those who lack a pro-158 seeming state when they consider the core proposition, which is not the same thing as159 its seeming to them that it's false.) Suppose the seemers achieve a simple majority-by160 one. Well then, on the principle that a simple majority wins, the core proposition-the161 proposition that the universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings-has the162 property of simpliciter seemingness: it seems to be true. But now imagine that two of163 the seemers die in an auto accident. Then the no-seemers have a majority by one. Has164 the core proposition just lost the property of simpliciter seemingness? Or imagine that165 whenever the no-seemers discover that the seemers have a majority, they knock off166 just enough seemers to make the core proposition lose that property. Does the core167 proposition keep gaining and losing the property of simpliciter seemingness? Perhaps168 the simple majority principle isn't the right one. Perhaps there's another principle, for169 example the two-thirds majority principle. But why prefer it? For that matter, why170 prefer any of them? Doesn't it all seem just a little...arbitrary? More importantly, is171 this really the sort of reflection and concern that Dougherty wants us to bring to a172 consideration of the data of his explanatory version of the evidential argument from173 evil?174 Of course, it might be that when Athea informs us that "The universe seems indif-175 ferent to the suffering of sentient beings" she means to say neither more nor less than176 that "The universe seems to me-Athea-to be indifferent to the suffering of sentient177 being". Suppose that's true. Then we have an explanatory version of the argument from178 evil for atheism that takes as its datum, as what's "given," that it seems to Athea that the179 universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings, that the core proposition-180 that the universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings-has the property of181 seeming to be true to Athea. While some people may find this datum to be compelling182 evidence to think that there is no God, I have a difficult time getting jazzed up about it.183 Upshot Athea informs us that it is "given" that "The universe seems indifferent to184 the suffering of sentient beings". However, it's difficult to know what she's proposing185 as "given". It can't be that it seems that an inanimate object, the universe, has a mental186 state, the state of indifference. But when we turn to something less contentious, we're187 left with the overreaching seemer's fallacy or the reference class problem or something188 of relatively little interest. So what's the "data"? What's "given"?189 Of course, if what's given is simply the core proposition-i.e., the proposition that190 the universe is indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings-and not the additional191 claim that that proposition seems to be true, then we won't have any difficulties of the192 sort I've just been surveying. But if we go this route, then it becomes very important193 to know what non-metaphorical proposition, exactly, is "given". If it is the proposition194 that sentient beings on earth suffer in a variety of ways without need or benefit, we195 might well wish to ask "Without need for what? And, without benefit for whom?"196 123 Journal: 11153-RELI Article No.: 9501 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2014/12/17 Pages: 8 Layout: Small-X R ev is ed Pr oo f Int J Philos Relig If the answer is "Without need for anyone's good, and without benefit to anyone,"197 we might well then ask, "Why do you suppose that sentient beings on earth suffer198 in a variety of ways without need for anyone's good or benefit to anyone?" If the199 answer is "Because we can't think of any good for which it is needed and we can't200 think of any benefit for anyone," then we will not have been given an argument that is201 "fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism".202 I propose to pretend in what follows that we know what data is given. Now let's203 inspect the argument itself, with Dougherty's claim in mind: that the argument he204 states is "fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism".205 (The qualification "except insofar as they can be brought to bear on premise 3" need206 not concern us.)207 The argument208 There are three points to make about Dougherty's argument in relation to his claim.209 First, (4) does not follow from premises (1) to (3). According to Athea, the data210 confirm HI but not theism since, given equal priors, it is known that HI predicts the211 data and it is unknown whether theism predicts it. That's a non-sequitur. At best, all212 that follows is213 4′. The data confirm HI and it is unknown whether the data confirm theism.214 Notably, at least some of those who are attuned to "considerations pertaining to skep-215 tical theism" will warmly embrace (4′). Indeed, this is exactly the sort of thing the216 skeptical theist might say, not to mention her friends the skeptical atheist and the217 skeptical agnostic.218 In order to avoid the non-sequitur and the warmly embracable (4′), we must add a219 premise to Dougherty's argument. Perhaps this will do: it is known that theism does220 not predict the data. Or perhaps this: theism does not predict the data. I'm not sure221 which to add, but add we must lest our interest in Dougherty's argument turns to dust.222 Let's mention both of them and leave it up to Athea which she would prefer:223 2.5 (It is known that) theism does not predict the data.224 Second, in the first paragraph of the informal commentary Dougherty uses the scale225 metaphor to tell us "how the argument works". There we read this sentence: "Premise226 2 says that there is nothing to put on the scale marked 'Theism."' This sentence is227 false. That's because premise (2) in the argument states "2. It is unknown whether the228 hypothesis of theism predicts the data" and, if we aim to translate (2) into the terms229 of the scale metaphor, we should say "Premise (2) says that it is unknown whether230 there is anything to put on the scale marked 'Theism'," and not what Dougherty says.231 Of course, when we dwell a moment on this better translation of premise (2), we will232 want to ask "Unknown to whom?," the answer to which can only be "us," in which case233 the best translation of (2) in the terms of the scale metaphor is "It is unknown to us234 whether there is anything to put on the scale marked 'Theism"'. Now, I submit that it's235 pretty close to obvious that the way to translate premise (2) of Dougherty's argument is236 not "There is nothing to put on the scale marked 'Theism"' but rather "It is unknown237 to us whether there is anything to put on the scale marked 'Theism"'. How could238 123 Journal: 11153-RELI Article No.: 9501 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2014/12/17 Pages: 8 Layout: Small-X R ev is ed Pr oo f Int J Philos Relig someone confuse the former for the latter? Well, if one were unconsciously drawing239 the inference "It is unknown to us whether there is anything to put on the scale marked240 'Theism'; therefore, there is nothing to put on the scale marked 'Theism'," one might241 engage in that confusion. Indeed, it's difficult not to see in the informal commentary an242 implicit noseeum inference like this. And, as everyone knows, noseeum inferences-243 whether explicit or implicit-are hardly "fundamentally immune to considerations244 pertaining to skeptical theism".245 Third, if there is a noseeum inference implicit in Dougherty's informal commentary,246 we might well expect to find one implicit in the argument itself, or something close247 enough to one so as not to be "fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining248 to skeptical theism". Is our expectation well-founded? Well, the argument explicitly249 contains this premise:250 2. It is unknown [to us] whether the hypothesis of theism predicts the data.251 And, as we've seen, the argument is a non-sequitur unless we charitably add premise252 (2.5):253 2.5 (It is known that) the hypothesis of theism does not predict the data.254 Once we exercise charity, however, we might well ask how these two premises are255 related to each other. Do they just show up in the argument side-by-side, having nothing256 to do with each other? Surely not. Surely the thrust of thought here requires a closer257 connection than that. Surely it requires that the latter is inferred from the former. Thus,258 a more perspicuous expression of Dougherty's explanatory version of the evidential259 argument from evil goes as follows:260 1. It is known that HI predicts the data of an apparently indifferent universe.261 2. It is unknown [to us] whether theism predicts the data.262 2.5 Therefore, (it is known that) theism does not predict the data. (2.5)263 3. The hypotheses have approximately equal prior probabilities.264 4. Therefore, the data confirm HI and not theism. (1, 2.5, 3)265 And, clearly enough, the inference from (2) to (2.5) is not "fundamentally immune to266 considerations pertaining to skeptical theism".267 After all, one might well wonder on the basis of considerations pertaining to skep-268 tical theism whether, grounds for belief in God aside, it would be unknown to us269 whether theism predicts the data or exactly how it predicts the data, if it did predict it.270 Moreover, one might well wonder on the basis of considerations pertaining to skep-271 tical theism whether (i) the move from "Theism has the property of being unknown272 by us to predict the data" to "Theism has the property of not predicting the data" is273 reasonable, or whether (ii) the move from "Theism has the property of being unknown274 by us to predict the data" to "Theism has the property of being known by us not to275 predict the data" is reasonable. Furthermore, one might well point out that theism does276 not predict that the universe seems indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings only277 if there is no good or other reason that would justify God in permitting the universe to278 seem indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings-an obvious implication that we279 must not be in doubt about if we are to reasonably infer that theism does not predict280 the data. In that case, one might naturally wonder why we should believe that there is281 123 Journal: 11153-RELI Article No.: 9501 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2014/12/17 Pages: 8 Layout: Small-X R ev is ed Pr oo f Int J Philos Relig no such good or other reason. The fact that the argument or its informal commentary282 already invites us to move easily from the unknown to the known strongly suggests283 that lurking here is another such invitation, to move easily from "we don't know of284 any such good or other reason" to "there is no such good or reason"-which is hardly285 "fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism".286 It may well be that one day someone will come up with an explanatory version of287 the evidential argument from evil that is "fundamentally immune to considerations288 pertaining to skeptical theism". This much is clear, however: if Dougherty's argument289 is any indication of the prospects for such an argument, that day is a long way off.7290 References291 Bergmann, M. (2009). Skeptical theism and the problem of evil. In T. Flint & M. Rea (Eds.), Oxford292 handbook of philosophical theology (pp. 375–399). Oxford: Oxford University Press.293 Dougherty, T. (2014). Skeptical theism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. http://294 plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/skeptical-theism/.295 Draper, P. (1989). Pain and pleasure: An evidential problem for theists. Nous, 23, 331–350.296 Draper, P. (1992). Probabilistic arguments from evil. Religious Studies, 28, 303–317.297 Draper, P., & Dougherty, T. (2013). Explanation and the problem of evil. In J. McBrayer & D. Howard-298 Snyder (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to the problem of evil (pp. 67–82). Walden, MA: Wiley299 Blackwell.300 Howard-Snyder, D. (Unpublished). "Agnosticism and draper's explanatory version of the evidential argu-301 ment from evil".302 Rowe, W. (1979). The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly,303 16, 335–341.304 Rowe, W. (1986). The empirical argument from evil. In R. Audi & W. Wainwright (Eds.), Rationality,305 religious belief and moral commitment (pp. 227–247). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.306 Rowe, W. (1988). Evil and theodicy. Philosophical Topics, 16, 119–132.307 Rowe, W. (1991). Ruminations about evil. Philosophical Perspectives, 5, 69–88.308 Rowe, W. (1996). The evidential argument from evil: A second Look. In D. Howard-Snyder (Ed.), The309 evidential argument from evil (pp. 262–285). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.310 Rowe, W. (2003). Grounds for belief aside, does evil make atheism more reasonable than theism? In M.311 Peterson & R. J. VanArragon (Eds.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of religion (pp. 3–12).312 Malden: Blackwell.313 7 Thanks to Hud Hudson and Justin McBrayer for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 123 Journal: 11153-RELI Article No.: 9501 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2014/12/17 Pages: 8 Layout: Small-X